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Promotion Struck Him 
as Mysterious
Major-General A. Bruce Matthews Interviewed
J. L.  G R A N A T S T E I N
Abstract: Bruce Matthews was a militia artilleryman who finished the 
Second World War in command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. 
This transcript of a series of interviews conducted by J.L . Granatstein in 
1991 contains Matthews’ views on a wide range of issues related to the 
Canadian army in the Second World War including his candid comments on 
A.G .L. McNaughton, H.D.G. Crerar, G.G. Simonds, and H.L.N. Salmon, 
as well as various other senior commanders he worked with during the war.
Resume : Bruce Matthews etait un artilleur de la milice qui a termine 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale au commandement de la 2e Division de 
l ’infanterie canadienne. Cette transcription d ’une serie d ’entrevues menees 
par J.L. Granatstein en 1991 contient le point de vue de Bruce Matthews 
sur un large eventail de questionsliees a l ’armee canadienne pendant la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, notamment ses francs commentaires sur A.G.L. 
McNaughton, H.D.G. Crerar, G.G. Simonds et H.L.N. Salmon, ainsi que 
sur d ’autres commandants superieurs avec lesquels il atravaille pendant la 
guerre.
B r u c e  Ma t t h e w s  w a s  a militia artilleryman who finished the Second World War in command of the 2nd Canadian Division. 
He was born to money in 1909, went to private schools, and worked 
for his father’s brokerage firm during the Depression. But his true 
interest was the Militia, and he was one of the very good artillerymen 
produced out of the pre-war force.
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I interviewed him in his Toronto condominium on 25 April and 
10 June 1991, and I also had one telephone conversation with him. 
The three talks have been amalgamated here to make the text run 
roughly chronologically. Minor excisions and corrections have been 
made, but the original memoranda are in my papers at the York 
University Archives and at the Directorate of History and Heritage 
at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa.
A robust man during the war, Matthews was very thin and 
clearly not well when he spoke to me, and he died in September 
1991, three months after our last interview. The one truly striking 
point he made -  one that brought home to me what the war did to 
the families of those that served -  was that when he came back to 
Canada more than five years after he had last been with his wife, one 
of the twin sons he had never seen said, “Mommy, who is that man?” 
I remember weeping when I typed up my interview memorandum, 
and this utterly poignant remark makes me tear up still.
We met at his apartment, and Matthews began by talking of his 
early youth. He described himself as a dropout. He spent ten years at 
Upper Canada College then applied for the Royal Military College in 
1926-7 but failed the entrance exams, though narrowly. He was urged 
to sit them again, but refused and went to Europe, taking French 
lessons in Switzerland and sitting in on lectures at Geneva. Then it 
was back to Canada and into business with his father’s brokerage 
firm. [His father became lieutenant-governor of Ontario in 1937 and 
held the post until 1946.] He worked in New York City in 1929-30 
and was supposed to go to London, but came home because of the 
depression. Matthews then passed his time in the militia almost as a 
hobby; but he’d wanted to be in the service. He had, he said, wanted 
to join the naval reserve but when he was turned down for colour 
blindness, a neighbour, adjutant of an artillery regiment, hooked him 
instead. He found he could do reasonably well here, took the long 
course at Kingston...
He was in the artillery militia [30th Field Battery] in Toronto. 
The unit was terribly understrength and many men and all officers 
assigned their pay to the regiment. As it was, regimental funds had 
to be used to buy boots for the unit during the Depression when d n d
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couldn’t provide them. Militia was time consuming -  at least one 
night a week normally and an extra night or two if teaching a course 
or doing one. There was, he thought, good work done on theoretical 
training and at camp, though ammunition was short and one year 
there were literally no rounds to fire. Things began to change about 
1938 when he commanded the 15th Field Battery, with Military 
District No.2 becoming more attentive to the unit. The practice 
camps in 1938 and 1939 were well conducted with good instructors 
who put them through their paces. He enjoyed Permanent Force [p f ] 
officers’ company after hours and there was a lot of talk about his 
unit’s potential. There was, however, some tension between p f  and 
militia, though less so in artillery than other corps. “They embraced 
us.” Gunners stuck together, he said. There were a lot of gunner 
generals, so many that others complained of the “gunners’ union.”
He saw a lot of p f  instructors : C.F. Constantine, Guy Simonds, 
H.O.N. Brownfield, Titus Evans, the Andersons. He did the long 
course at Kingston to qualify as a 1st Lieutenant and lived in quarters 
for a couple of months and thus got to know the artillery P F ers there. 
He also did the militia staff course which he thought gave him a good 
sense of appreciations, orders, staff duties. The p f  officers who taught 
this course, on 1 or 2 nights a week, were good, and he thinks were 
p s c  s [i.e., had passed Staff College].
He did add that there was some grumbling in the Armoured 
Corps at P F ers, perhaps because it was new. He himself served under 
Brownfield and R.J. Leach, both p f  officers from the Royal Canadian 
Horse Artillery without problem. There was a problem in the p f  itself 
about promotion.
He met his wife in Toronto, though she was an American. Her 
mother was Canadian, her sister had married a Canadian, and she 
was visiting her sister. They married in 1937. And she came to the 
UK in 1940 to be with him. As an American, she was forbidden to 
travel, but his father, the lieutenant-governor, arranged a passport for 
her in 48 hours, and she came over. She had left one child at home, 
and returned in August 1940 when London laid down rules. After 
her return in 1941 she had twins, and acquaintances gossiped and 
counted months, not knowing she had been in the UK. Matthews did 
not get back to Canada for the entire six years of war; every time he 
was scheduled to return he would be promoted or posted. And when 
he did get back in late 1945, one of his twins, then over four, said, 
“Mommy, who is that man?”
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Promotion struck him as mysterious. The Military Secretary in 
Ottawa and Canadian Military Headquarters in London moved in 
strange ways, and other than seniority he didn’t know how it worked. 
He spent some time with Brownfield who was the first Commander 
Royal Artillery [c r a ] and they talked about people ; those with 
adverse comments on file went back to Canada. The problem was the 
huge expansion, the scramble for talent. There was experimentation 
and many failed.
As for himself, he had come into the militia after taking the 
long course, and he was promoted reasonably quickly to captain. He 
served as adjutant of his unit, the 7th Regiment, and his unit was 
mobilized in September 1939 -  a tribute to its results at camp and 
in competition and to its very near complete strength. It was also 
for geography, but based on some crude assessments of readiness. He 
thought there were differences between Toronto and Prairie-Maritime 
artillery units : sophistication. Their officers were a bit crude but 
competent -  he called his a schoolboy attitude -  and there was no 
fraternization for a time. But [overseas] postings broke this down. He 
agreed there was an element of snobbery here, of class.
In the UK his battery and another merged and he was left over; 
he thought he might get sent home, but instead he was posted to 
the 1st Medium Regiment ; in 1941 when a new Medium Regiment, 
the 5th, was formed General A.G.L. McNaughton called him in and 
offered him command. He was allowed to handpick 40 men from his 
old regiment and 40 more from another. Matthews claimed to have 
been puzzled by his rise. He obviously kept track of his rank -  he 
knew he was senior artillery major in 1941, e.g., but he never got the 
call. He wasn’t bypassed, it was just that he didn’t get a regiment 
until then.
He admitted to a certain nervousness about taking over a unit 
of that size, but more from fear of artillery accidents. As it was, the 
Brits were very helpful, friendly -  “they were damn glad to see us.” 
He did say that his regiment initially had steel-wheeled 60-pounders, 
but they devised a way of carrying them on tank transporters and 
found they could get into action almost as quickly as rubber-tired 
guns. He worried too about the lack of opportunity to train with 
other arms, and when exercises of that sort began he was frustrated 
that the other units weren’t ready. Later as a Counter-Battery Officer 
[of I Canadian Corps, 1942-43], he roamed around as eyes and ears 
for the Commander Corps Royal Artillery [c c r a ], he being under-
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Major-General A. Bruce Matthews.
[Library and Archives Canada PA 138399]
employed, and found that some artillery regiments were slack -  no 
pickets etc. This suggested the truth of complaints about the training 
standard.
He described [g o c  1st Canadian Division Major-General H.L.N.] 
Salmon as a conventional commander, no innovator. He wasn’t easy 
to serve under, though he was pleasant enough. But he wasn’t always 
clear in training in giving his instructions, and it was hard for officers 
to know what to do. Still, even if he was no Simonds, he knew his way 
around. He remembers a Monty order for all officers to do physical 
training (p t ) for 30 minutes per day and Salmon always arriving 
late for the h q  exercises -  the awkward squad. In his own medium 
regiment there was vigorous p t  five days a week.
McNaughton, he said, was revered the first year, especially by 
gunners. But his charm diminished considerably. He used to hear 
senior people bemoaning him. Andy was a dragon about equipment 
and could be found under a vehicle. He literally remembered going 
to a conference at Corps and finding McNaughton under a truck, 
looking for the source of transmission problems. But he had a difficult 
role -  Cabinet orders to keep Canada first. He wasn’t an eloquent
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man and didn’t try to persuade the Brits of this -  he would just say 
these are my orders. There was a sense about him of refighting World 
War I, and General Brooke [the Chief of the Imperial General Staff] 
and Monty found him tiresome, lacking in spirit and drive.
In Sicily and Italy [where he was c r a  of 1st Canadian Division 
in the rank of brigadier], Matthews admired 8th Army procedures 
where there were no frills but all were kept informed. Verbal orders 
were followed occasionally by a memo. Thus when he became c c r a  
in North West Europe [of II Canadian Corps from January 1944], he 
never had time and he had constant meetings to work out fire plans, 
but it was easy as he’d watched 8th Army operate. Other senior 
commanders had difficulty in figuring out what was wanted after a 
Corps or Army Orders Group...
He spoke of the freedom a g o c  had in Italy where they were more 
on their own. In North West Europe, however, the operations were 
so big you were just a cog, and there was little a g o c  could do about 
tactical requirements. It was a rushed, difficult atmosphere in which 
to command. After the Normandy breakthrough and after the Rhine 
crossings there were periods of relative freedom, however.
We talked about his own role as a division commander. He wasn’t 
awed by this. As a c r a  and c c r a , he had intimate relations with 
infantry and armoured commanders, watched attacks with them, and 
he knew their minds better, he thought, than they did. The turnover 
in infantry commanders was such that he’d been involved longer 
than many of them -  George Kitching, Rod Keller, Dan Spry, etc. 
(Kitching, he added, was very able and found himself caught in a 
difficult situation between the Poles and Canadians in August 1944. 
As it was, he made a good comeback after he was sacked. Matthews 
doubted that even a highly trained 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
could have done better at Falaise -  the fog of war was terrific. It 
surprised him when Kitching was sacked so quickly, but he didn’t 
think Simonds did it to save his own job. Certainly there was no 
rumour machine in operation. He felt sorry for Kitching).
Matthews had had reasonable experience in Sicily and Italy, but 
even so it was difficult to command. He gave brigadiers a free run, 
and his job was to allocate support to them. He had trouble with 
[Brigadier W.J.] Megill, the one P F er who may have resented serving 
under a militia g o c , but it was too late in the war to do anything 
about this.
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Simonds would come frequently to his h q  as would [First 
Canadian Army commander General Harry] Crerar and Monty. 
Simonds drew up the overall plan, allocating areas to his divisions. 
He’d go over Matthews’ plan, asking pointed questions. But most 
discussion/negotiation was through g s o i s  who argued over supplies, 
road use, etc. As a division commander, Matthews modelled himself 
on Simonds. He would go forward to brigades, as he was constantly 
urged to do. And when an attack was on, he’d try to go to battalions 
near the start line to sense if the company and platoon commanders 
had a grip on their objectives. The problem was that time for 
reconnaissance was never available, and as a result there were always 
mines, etc., that no one knew about. Of course, because we had air 
superiority, battalions could be trucked very close to the start lines.
His 2nd Division had had a hard time -  Dieppe and then Carpiquet 
in Normandy. Morale had dents in it. When he took over in November 
1944, he was told that the division needed careful handling and its 
morale boosted, as well as more training. Fortunately he had 6-8 
weeks to do this, and he ran company schools, training, etc. He also 
gave reassurance, reasoned with the troops, asked for questions, etc.
He tried to avoid hospital visits, something easy to do because 
evacuation was so prompt. He was appalled by the casualties, tried 
to talk to the troops about this and to assure them he was trying 
to minimize them. He talked of this with Simonds and [II Canadian 
Corps’ Chief of Staff, Brigadier N. Elliott] Rodger too -  was 
everything being done to minimize casualties? Had something gone 
seriously wrong if they were high in a particular operation? What 
made it all harder was the reinforcement situation and the cold, wet 
winter of 1944-45.
He thought Crerar was a professional, but so academic in the way 
he approached things by the book. He could be charming to talk to, 
but his Orders Groups weren’t inspiring as he monotonously outlined 
his plans. There was not much vigour there, not much aggression, 
though he wasn’t incompetent. Matthews said he didn’t resent this, 
but it was clear he was no admirer. Nor did he admire Churchill 
Mann [Crerar’s chief of staff]. There was a gap between Mann and 
the division commanders because Mann was eccentric. He seemed to 
feel he had to polish up Crerar’s plans to make them more dynamic.
Simonds lived up to his reputation. He was brusque and demanding 
but reasonable. If you said a plan wouldn’t work, he’d listen, though 
he might insist. He had a reputation for being ruthless with people,
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but Matthews saw no signs of this. As c r a  in 1st Division he was 
close to him ; of course, Simonds understood gunners’ problems. For 
example, Matthews’ Headquarters ship was sunk en route to Sicily, 
and he landed with a typewriter and a clerk. He spoke warmly of the 
way the Brits helped the Canadians learn. They gave advice with 
good grace. The armour got similar help, but the infantry, he said, 
didn’t -  it was too big. Despite the borrowed help, when the first 
divisional shoot was laid on, he had to tell Simonds that it couldn’t 
start when scheduled. “When will it be ready?” “Three hours later.” 
“Then make it so.” Simonds trusted Matthews.
Still, as a commander Simonds kept the pressure on which 
contributed to casualties and waste. He would regularly get annoyed 
at the armour which wouldn’t go far enough forward for him. He 
pioneered night armoured attacks in Normandy, and Matthews did 
the fire plan using tracers, etc. as guides. There were real problems 
with supplies, and the bridgehead was chaos; red smoke shells arrived 
only at the last minute, e.g. The real difficulty was that everything 
had to be done at once, that there was never time. For example, the 
old idea of registering artillery targets was scrapped, and they shot 
by the map -  a problem as the maps weren’t very accurate. The 
pressure, the magnitude of the operations, was unbelievable. Simonds 
was genuinely innovative, though he had limited success. At Caen, 
he had 4th Armoured Division which was semi-trained, and 2nd and 
3rd Divisions which had had a hard time.
He mentioned that after the war Simonds married the ex-wife of 
G.G. Sinclair, a lawyer, and the two of them and the Matthews went 
to Jamaica together a few times. Simonds decided to learn golf and 
spent hours practicing. He wanted to be good at anything he did, and 
his wife would ask Matthews how he’d played, knowing that there’d 
be trouble if things had gone badly. He became a good player.
Rod Keller and Chris Vokes were close friends. Matthews knew 
Vokes well but not Keller. He never felt confident that either really 
grasped things. Vokes was likeable and full of energy, but very 
nervous at times. He would ring up Matthews as c r a  in the middle of 
the night, worried about some firing. In fact he was an ideal brigade 
commander, comfortable lying in the mud looking through binoculars. 
But he didn’t meet the standards the 8th Army or Simonds wanted. 
Keller was the same, and his artillery commanders had a hard time 
with him. It was difficult to find him in action. Vokes was very
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critical of everyone from the prime minister on down and didn’t think 
much of the higher echelons.
Charles Foulkes he liked as an individual, but he wasn’t popular 
with his commanders or 8th Army. He had a difficult time with 2nd 
Division and got really smeared at Carpiquet. It wasn’t his fault that 
he had trouble with his brigade commanders -  he hadn’t had the 
division long. Foulkes and Simonds tolerated one another, though he 
thought Foulkes was envious of Simonds. Still, Foulkes was a better 
corps commander than a division commander.
Why did Foulkes rise despite all? Probably his seniority as a 
PFer who couldn’t be overlooked. Clearly Matthews couldn’t quite 
understand this -  others could have done better with 2nd Division, 
like [Brigadier Sherwood] Lett, and again he said Foulkes was 
unpopular up and down.
Harry Foster was a better brigadier than division commander, a 
tough fighter. He thought he didn’t enjoy being a division commander. 
But when Foster (or Vokes with whom he traded divisions) was on his 
flank they did all that was asked. (Later, in a telephone conversation 
on 14 May 1991, General Matthews said that he thought he’d been 
too harsh on Vokes and Foster. Both were good brigade commanders, 
and he was incorrect if he suggested they were a bit edgy as division 
commanders. He had no right to say that, and he’d served under 
Vokes for 7-8 months without difficulty.)
Holly Keefler was ambitious and able, though Matthews didn’t 
like the way he instantly adopted Highland dress when he took over 
3rd Division. He thought he looked down at others because of his 
education. Still he was a good brigade commander, and he got on 
well with him.
Dan Spry was dreadfully young -  about a month or two younger 
than Matthews! Their first action in Italy, when Spry got a brigade, 
had a complex plan requiring two barrages and a change of axis 
between. It didn’t work and Matthews as c r a  had to stop the barrage 
in mid-shoot, something never done. But Spry learned. Then the 
strain got too much, and he had to be relieved.
Matthews said he thought Canada, for political reasons, took on 
too much in the war. The country couldn’t support an Army, and we 
were always begging for assistance. It would have been better just to 
have two corps and serve under the UK.
On reinforcements : there were problems especially with French- 
Canadian units, but he didn’t seem to see them as darkly as Ottawa
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did. He had enough French to cope, and he could talk to the French­
speaking units (two battalions and one medium regiment) in 2nd 
Division. He got on well with them. Still, he had to put anglophone 
officers into the Maisonneuves, officers who couldn’t speak French. He 
blamed our making too many commitments for the [officer shortage] 
crisis, though he didn’t criticize [Defence Minister J. Layton] Ralston 
who worked hard.
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